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I. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a final Judgment dated December 2, 1994 (a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Appendix A), entered by The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The Supreme Court, acting 
pursuant to Rule 42, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, transferred this appeal to this court by 
order dated February 16, 1995. 
H. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: 
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that a mobile home park lessor's temporary 
waiver of its right to declare an immediate forfeiture of a lease with its lessee did not, as a 
matter of law, require the lessor to notify the tenant that unless she cured her default by a date 
certain, the lessor would proceed with its forfeiture remedy. 
This issue is a question of law on which this court will not defer to the trial court, but 
will review the trial court's determination for correctness. Pratt by and through Pratt v. Mitchell 
Hall Irrigation Co.. 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991); Avila v. Winn. 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 
1990). 
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in. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. ORDINANCES OR RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules whose interpretation 
is believed to be solely determinative of the issues on appeal. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Appellee Crescentwood Village, Inc. ("CVI") instituted this action under the Utah Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act, Utah Code Ann. §§57-16-1 et seq.« to terminate the interest of its 
lessee, appellant June Johnson ("Mrs. Johnson") in a lease agreement dated July 1, 1992 ("Lease 
Agreement")1 and dispossess Mrs. Johnson from the leased property ("Property"). (R. 2-11). 
CVI's claimed basis for terminating the Lease Agreement and evicting Mrs. Johnson from the 
Property was her failure to cure several alleged violations of rules governing the Property. Id. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court, 
Shortly after CVI filed its complaint, Mrs. Johnson began depositing with the court clerk 
the rent payments due under the Lease Agreement. (R. 64-66). She made all of the required 
payments. (R. 632). 
At trial, the court determined that Mrs. Johnson completely cured two, and substantially 
cured one, of the three events of default specified in CVI's notice of default ("Notice of 
1
 A copy of the Lease Agreement is attached hereto as Appendix B. 
2 
Default"),2 and that she did so within the required fifteen day cure period. (R. 605). The court 
further determined that over the next seventy days, CVI took no action to terminate the Lease 
Agreement, but instead "tried to work with [her]." (R. 610).3 At the end of this seventy day 
period of forbearance, CVI provided Mrs. Johnson with two verbal warnings that "things 
weren't looking good" and that it would evict her "if things didn't get going." (Tr. at R. 
750-51). These warnings never specified a date certain by which the uncured event of default 
had to be cured for Mrs. Johnson to avoid being evicted. (Tr. at R. 751-52). About three days 
later, Mrs. Johnson paid two months of back rent in response to CVI's written demand. (Tr. 
at R. 695). CVI accepted her payment. Id. However, on the following day, CVI served Mrs. 
Johnson with a Notice of Termination.4 (R. 606). 
The court held that even though CVI had relaxed the fifteen day cure period specified 
in the Notice of Default by "work[ing] with" Mrs. Johnson for seventy days in an effort to cure 
the single uncured event of default, CVI could summarily terminate the Lease Agreement at the 
end of that forbearance period without apprising Mrs. Johnson of a date certain by which her 
full cure was required. (R. 607, 610). The court accordingly entered judgment against Mrs. 
Johnson for rent in the amount of $3,200.00 and attorney's fees and costs in the amount of 
2
 A copy of the Notice of Default is attached hereto as Appendix C. 
3
 In correctly determining that CVI relaxed the requirement in the Notice of Default that any cure be 
accomplished within the specified fifteen-day period, the court properly credited the trial testimony of CVI's park 
manager that M[a]fter agreeing with her that it [the Property] was really starting to look better we would just go on 
past that 15-day notice . . . ." (Tr. at R. 739). 
4
 A copy of the Notice of Termination is attached hereto as Appendix D. 
3 
$9,413.50. (R. 617-18). The court further evicted Mrs. Johnson from the Property and 
terminated her interest in the Lease Agreement. Id. This relief was embodied in the court's 
Judgment dated December 2, 1994 and was based upon its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law.5 Mrs. Johnson filed her notice of appeal on December 12, 1994. (R. 619). 
C. Statement of Facts, 
Both before and after the Lease Agreement was signed in July 1992, CVI and 
Mrs. Johnson had numerous disputes regarding the terms and conditions of Mrs. Johnson's 
occupancy of the Property. (Finding of Fact No. 21, R. 610; Tr. at R. 654, 671). The parties' 
efforts to resolve those disputes resulted in a "pattern" under which CVI" . . . tried to work with 
[Mrs. Johnson]." (Finding of Fact No. 21, R. 610). Near the end of this "pattern," on May 
6, 1993, CVI served Mrs. Johnson with the Notice of Default. (Finding of Fact No. 7, R. 605). 
The Notice of Default apprised Mrs. Johnson that she was in violation of the Lease 
Agreement for three reasons: (i) she maintained an unlicensed motor vehicle in her driveway 
("Event of Default No. 1"), (ii) her yard had too many weeds and her driveway was too 
cluttered ("Event of Default No. 2"), and (iii) her home needed to be repainted ("Event of 
Default No. 3") (collectively, the "Events of Default"). Id. The Notice of Default advised Mrs. 
Johnson that she had fifteen days in which to cure the Events of Default, and that if she failed 
to do so within that period of time, CVI would commence eviction proceedings. Id. The 
second unnumbered paragraph of the Notice of Default advised Mrs. Johnson that if she actually 
A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached hereto as Appendix E. 
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cured the Events of Default, but later violated the same or different rules of the mobile home 
park, " . . . this will result in forfeiture of [her] lease and eviction without any further period of 
cure." Id.6 
Of the three Events of Default, the trial court properly determined that Mrs. Johnson had 
fully and timely cured Event of Default No. 1 and Event of Default No. 3, but had only 
substantially cured Event of Default No. 2. (Finding of Fact Nos. 7, 8, R. 605). After the 
fifteen day cure period specified in the Notice of Default expired on May 21, 1993, CVI took 
no action to terminate the Lease Agreement or dispossess Mrs. Johnson from the Property. (Tr. 
at R. 739, 747). Rather, because Mrs. Johnson had cured Event of Default No. 1 and Event 
of Default No. 3, and was attempting to cure Event of Default No. 2, CVI agreed " . . . to work 
with her for awhile." (R. 610; Tr. at R. 747). According to the testimony of CVI's own 
manager, CVI " . . . agree[d] with [Mrs. Johnson] that it [the Property] was really starting to 
look better [and] we would just go on past that 15-day notice . . . ." (Tr. at R. 739). 
Therefore, CVI extended through late July 1993 — some seventy days after the expiration of the 
fifteen day cure period specified in the Notice of Default — the period within which Mrs. 
Johnson could cure Event of Default No. 2. (Tr. at R. 747). 
However, at the end of July 1993 — two or three days after Mrs. Johnson had given birth 
to her new baby, Tr. at R. 753 — CVI's manager told Mrs. Johnson that " . . . we could not 
6
 Because the trial court determined that Mrs. Johnson did not cure all the Events of Default, see Findings of 
Fact Nos. 7 and 8 at R. 605, this provision of the Notice of Default ~ a provision which presumes to confer on CVI 
the right to summarily forfeit the Lease Agreement - is not applicable as a matter of law. 
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work with her any longer and that we would be evicting if things didn't get going at the end of 
July." (Tr. at R. 751). That oral notification never specified a date certain by which Mrs. 
Johnson had to fully cure Event of Default No. 2 to avoid having the Lease Agreement forfeited. 
(Tr. at R. 751-52). According to CVTs manager, the only date certain that CVI had ever 
provided to Mrs. Johnson was the fifteen day cure period specified in the Notice of Default. 
(Tr. at R. 752). 
In the meantime, about two weeks earlier on July 14, 1993, CVI served Mrs. Johnson 
with a Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate the Property ("Three-Day Notice"). (Tr. at R. 
694-95). In response to the Three-Day Notice, Mrs. Johnson paid all of the required rent with 
a check that she delivered to CVI on August 2, 1993. (Tr. at R. 695). At the time CVI 
accepted that payment, it knew that on the following day it would be seeking to terminate the 
Lease Agreement. (Tr. at R. 700, 760). However, CVI never informed Mrs. Johnson of that 
fact. (Tr. at R. 704). CVI accordingly served Mrs. Johnson with its Notice of Termination on 
August 3, 1993. (Tr. at R. 665). Even after CVI purported to terminate the Lease Agreement, 
CVI consistently noted on its payment ledger card that Mrs. Johnson was responsible for the 
payment of late charges owing under the Lease Agreement. (Trial Exhibit 46; Tr. at R. 694). 
Mrs. Johnson asserted at trial that under Utah law, once CVI relaxed the fifteen day cure 
period specified in its Notice of Default, CVI could not subsequently insist upon strict 
compliance with the Notice of Default without providing an unequivocal notice that tardy 
performance would not be further tolerated. (Tr. at R. 766-72). The trial court, however, held 
6 
that no such notice was required. (Finding of Fact No. 13, R. 607). It accordingly entered 
judgment against Mrs. Johnson for unpaid rent, attorney's fees, and forfeiture of the Lease 
Agreement. (R. 617-18). 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the Notice of Default that CVI served upon Mrs. Johnson, Mrs. Johnson was 
granted a period of fifteen days in which to cure the Events of Default or face eviction from the 
Property. Because Mrs. Johnson timely and fully cured two, and substantially cured one, of the 
three Events of Default, CVI decided to work with Mrs. Johnson beyond the fifteen day cure 
period. In doing so, CVI temporarily waived its right to immediately forfeit the Lease 
Agreement and evict Mrs. Johnson from the Property. 
Utah law has long recognized that a promisee who has informed its promisor that strict 
performance will not be required, but who later decides to require strict performance, must 
provide the promisor with reasonable, advance notice that no further forbearance will be granted. 
Under this principle, CVI was required to provide Mrs. Johnson with an unequivocal notice that 
her failure to cure all of the Events of Default by a date certain would result in CVI's forfeiture 
of the Lease Agreement and Mrs. Johnson's eviction from the Property. CVI's decision to pull 
the forfeiture trigger on Mrs. Johnson without such notice violated Utah law. 
7 
VI. : 
ARGUMENT 
AFTER CVI AGREED TO RELAX THE FIFTEEN DAY CURE PERIOD 
SPECIFIED BY ITS NOTICE OF DEFAULT, IT WAS REQUIRED BY UTAH 
LAW TO PROVIDE MRS. JOHNSON WITH REASONABLE NOTICE OF A NEW 
DATE CERTAIN BY WHICH MRS. JOHNSON WAS REQUIRED TO CURE. 
Utah law " . . . disfavor[s] forfeiture where the [promisee] has misled the [promisor] into 
thinking that the forfeiture provision will not be strictly enforced." Adair v. Bracken. 745 P.2d 
849, 852 (Utah App. 1987).7 Accord, Grow v. Marwick Dev.. Inc.. 621 P.2d 1249, 1251-52 
(Utah 1980). This is an extension of the principle that a promisee who has induced its promisor 
to believe that strict performance will not be required, must provide the promisor with 
reasonable, advance notice before it can insist on strict performance. Pacific Dev. Co. v. 
Stewart, 195 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1948). Accord. 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord & Tenant § 327 
(1995) ("[t]he landlord must give sufficient notice to the lessee of the landlord's intent to insist 
upon strict compliance with the lease terms where such compliance has not been required in the 
past"); Angus Hunt Ranch. Inc. v. REB. Inc.. 577 P.2d 645, 650 (Wyo. 1978) ("so where the 
time fixed by the contract for performance is permitted to pass, both parties concurring, the time 
of performance thereafter becomes indefinite, and one party cannot rescind until full notice and 
a reasonable time for performance is given"). This principle means that " . . . the acceptance 
by the [promisee] of the [promisor's] past due payments and its other conduct towards the 
7
 Because ". . . forfeiture is a harsh remedy, clarity must be required before any notice will work such a 
result." Dang v. Cox Corp.. 655 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1982). Accord. Russell v. Park City Corp.. 546 P.2d 1274, 
1276 (Utah 1973). 
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[promisor] leading the latter to believe that strict performance would not be required by the 
[promisee], imposes upon the [promisee] the duty of giving to the [promisor] a reasonable notice 
before it may insist on strict performance by the [promisor]." Pacific Dev. Co.. 195 P.2d at 
750. 
The requirement of such notice " . . . is based upon the equitable consideration that by 
his conduct the [promisee] has led the [promisor] into the belief that the former will continue 
to waive the strict performance of the contract." Id. See also Tanner v. Baadsgaard. 612 P.2d 
345, 347 (Utah 1980) (seller who waives strict compliance with payment schedule in earnest 
money agreement must give notice and a reasonable time to perform before thereafter strictly 
enforcing the time requirement); Morris v. Svkes. 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981) (where 
contracting parties were negotiating a reinstatement at the time of seller's notice of termination 
of contract, "fairness" would require definite notice to buyer upon default that he must "pay up, 
or forfeit" the payments he had made under the contract). Fuhriman v. Bissegger. 375 P.2d 27, 
28 (Utah 1962) (where the promisee had waived strict or substantial compliance and had failed 
to unequivocally apprise the promisor of what was required of him to avoid termination, " . . . 
this behavior led [the promisor] to believe that strict performance is not required.") 
Where the promisee has temporarily waived default and has made contradictory demands, 
this " . . . would leave some doubt in the [promisor's] mind as to what the [promisee] expected 
and lead the [promisor] to believe that strict compliance with the contract is not required, 
estop[ping] [the promisee] from effecting a forfeiture of the [promisor's] interest." Grow v. 
9 
MarwickDev.. Inc.. 621 P.2d at 1252. The right of the promisor to receive a notice specifying 
that it has a reasonable time in which to cure its default is necessary because "without this notice 
the defaulting [promisor] would not know what to do." Hansen v. Christensen. 545 P.2d 1152, 
1154 (Utah 1976). In the final analysis, a promisee has no obligation to grant forbearance to 
its promisor beyond what is required by their contract and specified by the promisee's notice; 
however, once the promisee does so, it cannot decide unilaterally to insist on strict performance 
without providing its debtor with advance notice that strict performance will be required. Adair, 
745 P.2d at 859; Tanner. 612 P.2d at 347; Fuhriman. 375 P.2d at 28; Pacific Dev.. 195 P.2d 
at 750. 
In this case, it is undisputed that CVI agreed to relax the fifteen day cure period specified 
in its Notice of Default. CVTs own on-site manager testified that he ". . . agree[d] with 
[Mrs. Johnson] that it [the Property] was really starting to look better [and] we would just go 
on past that 15-day notice . . . ." (Tr. at R. 739). It is also undisputed that that forbearance 
period extended for about 70 days, more than quadruple the initial specified cure period. (Tr. 
at R. 747). Once CVI agreed to relax or waive Mrs. Johnson's initial obligation to comply 
strictly with the cure period specified in the Notice of Default, CVI was obligated by Utah law 
to afford Mrs. Johnson a reasonable opportunity to cure the uncured event of default by a date 
certain or face forfeiture. Adair. 745 P.2d at 859; Tanner. 612 P.2d at 347; Fuhriman. 375 
P.2d at 28; Pacific Dev.. 195 P.2d at 750. CVI, however, never provided such an opportunity 
and never specified a date certain beyond which Mrs. Johnson faced immediate forfeiture of the 
10 
Lease Agreement and eviction from the Property. Rather, CVI only told Mrs. Johnson in late 
July 1993 that "things weren't looking good" and that it would evict her if "things didn't get 
going." (Tr. at R. 750-51). About three days later, Mrs. Johnson paid, and CVI accepted, past 
due rent in response to a Three-Day Notice which had been served on her two weeks earlier. 
(Tr. at R. 695). The following day, however, CVI unexpectedly pulled the forfeiture trigger 
on Mrs. Johnson and served her with a Notice of Termination. (R. 606). 
CVI's failure to provide Mrs. Johnson with a notice that it would require strict 
performance after a seventy day period of mutually agreed forbearance violated Utah law. The 
trial court's failure to apply settled law to the undisputed facts enabled CVI to forfeit the Lease 
Agreement and dispossess Mrs. Johnson from the Property when CVI had no legal right to do 
so. This Court accordingly should vacate the Judgment and remand the case with instructions 
to enter judgment in favor of Mrs. Johnson for all of the attorney's fees and costs that she has 
incurred to vindicate her rights under the Lease Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred, as a matter of law, in declining to apply the settled legal principle 
that a promisee who relaxes the requirement of strict performance cannot thereafter insist on 
strict performance without providing its promisor with reasonable advance notice that strict 
performance will be required by a date certain in the future. This Court should, therefore, 
11 
reverse and vacate the Judgment and remand this case to the district court with instructions to 
enter judgment in favor of Mrs. Johnson for all attorney's fees and costs that she reasonably and 
necessarily incurred to enforce her rights under the Lease Agreement. 
DATED this 7 day of May, 1995. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
John lv\Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 7 day of May, 1995, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to be mailed, via first-class, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
James R. Boud, Esq. 
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103 
Murray, Utah 84107 
"Sv. A £ v A ^ ~ 
0427bref.85a 
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ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN & BOUD, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-0300 
DEC 2 1994 
SALT L^.»~ COurt i i 
*^J&m 
/C±f\£, CiafK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CRESCENTWOOD VILLAGE, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUNE JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 930906137 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
The trial in the above case was heard before the 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley on Wednesday, November 2, 1994. The 
Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
hereby grants judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant and ORDERS, ADJUDGED AND DECREES as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is granted judgment against Defendant for 
the sum of $3,200.00 principal, $9,367.50 attorney's fees, and 
$46.00 costs for a total judgment of $12,613.50. 
2. The lease agreement between the Plaintiff and 
Defendant for the premises located at 255 East Hidden View Drive, 
#267, Sandy, Utah, is hereby terminated and the Clerk of the Court 
is directed to issue to Plaintiff a writ of restitution which will 
fl 0 A a 1 7 
direct the Constable and/or Sheriff of Salt Lake County to restore 
the premises to the Plaintiff. 
3. The third party complaint filed in this action is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to turn over to 
Plaintiff all rents that are currently being held in trust relating 
to this matter. Plaintiff is to credit Defendant these amounts 
upon receipt of the same. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded after-accruing costs and after-
accruing attorney's fees upon application to the Court for the same 
and a determination by the Court that such costs and fees are 
reasonable. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JohnxT. Anderson 
Attorney for Defendant 
014-072-bn 
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L t h i n f i v e - ( 3 ; days a f t e r dec dees . Roe i d i n t Cc: sg res ' . s : t - pay a * l a t i 
• large o f $ 3 . 0 0 . I n t h e e v e n t r e n t i s n o t p a i d w i t h i n ^ i - t o o n ( IS ) de / s a f t s . 
j e d a t e . R e s i d e n t (s> a g r e e t o pay an a d d i t i o n a l l a t o change o f £ 1 3 . 0 0 . 
: - s i d s n t ( e ) a - j r e e i e } t o -Fur ther pay f 1 5 - 0 0 f o r a d i s h o n o r e d ber.l. ohoe l : . 1? v 
l e d : i s d i s h o n o r e d , t h e Park may r e q u i r e R e s i d e n t (s> t o mal.c a l l f u t u r e 
ayments w i t h cash o r c a s h i e r ' s c h e c k . 
D e p o s i t R e f u n d s . Any r e t u r n a b l e d e p o s i t s s h a l l be d e l i v e r e d or m a i l e d t : 
L-s identCs) u x t h i n t h i r t y ' 3 0 ' days o f t s - r n i - . a t i c n c f t e n a n c y or w i t h i r 
i f t e e n (13) days o f r e c e i p t c f R e s i d e n t I s ; ? new n a i l i n g a d d r e s s , wh ichever i r 
?. ter . 
I --J II w** wxu/Ac wuuupqnuy • .lilt' jjr e:n.wej &!»€&!• cs- Lisrc as a residencc 
y the undersigned adult(s) and fe? children, and for nc other purpose 
ithout the prior written consent of the Park. 
Any children born to or legally adopted by Resident's) after moving intc 
ark shall be accepted, and Resident(s) will bs charged $3.00 per month per 
ach additional child. 
Occupancy by guests, whether or not related tc Resident(s) , staying over 
ifteen (15) days will be considered tc be in violation of this provisior 
nless prior written consent is given by the Par!.. 
Park Rules. A cc^y of Park Rules is attached and hereby made a part of 
lis lease. ftules may be changed by the Par!-: by giving 60 days written notice 
: Resident (s? . Rule changes e.rc incorporated as a part of this lease. 
:sidsnt(s) c-hr.ll also be bound by all rules psrtaining to the use of all 
Dmmon areas, including, but not limited to, the recreation building or 
.ubhouso and swimming pcjl. 
Unl awful and Disorderly Conduct. Reci dent iz) shall net permit any 
^lawful or immoral practice to be committed on the promises. Any conduct 
lich is defined as criminal or unlawful under the previsions of Utah state 
tw, or by local ordinance or statute. v.hether or net prosecuted by 
>vernment, shall be grounds for tcrmi nation of thic lease. Disorderly 
induct, abusive language. noisy disturbances, disregard of par!: rules, and 
iterferenee >uth the peaceful and quiet enjoyment of other residents is 
ohibited. Receipt cr complaints from three cv- more residents regarding 
sident<s) conduct shall bs the basis -f^r termination of this lease. 
Nuisance. Resident(s) shall net create or permit a nuisance on the 
emises-
P.'e s i d e n I •' - N L i a la i 1 i t y > Resident's? 5h.-»l I be liatle an-.' responsible fo-
e conduct of their speuss, children, and cuectc. 
Ordinance-: r.r:' Tta*jtrs. Pee :L dent '..) sS?ll cenply >.:ifch all cedes, 
atutes, ordinances and requirements e«f all municipal., county? state. and 
deral authorities new in force.. cr which may hereafter be in force, 
rtaining to their mobile heme and the use oT premises. 
Pete. M- pr;ts shall be Lroucr.i en the p-onisso without the prior 
itten consent of the Park. 
Su b 1 ea s e an e A s s i o nm% n1. This lease ma/ net be transferred or assigned, 
r the premises sublet without the written consent of the Par!:. 
Entry and Inspection. Par!-. and Park's agents shall hare access to the 
ased premises at all reasonable times to inspect and protect the same, tc 
DW the same to prospective residents and for making necessary improvements 
d repairs. 
Repairs. Resident 's) shall, at own crpsnse, and at all times, maintain 
? premises in a clean and sanitary manner. Resident(s) shall be responsible 
all repairs and for damages caused by his negligence and that of his 
nily or invitess or guests. 
Indemnification, Park will not bo responsible for accidents, injuries. 
loss of property by fire, theft, wind, floods, or other natural acts which 
e beyond its control. Park shall not be liable for any damage or injury tc 
ksident(s), or any other person, cr to any property, occurring on the. 
emises, or any part thereof, or in common areas, and Resident(s) shall hole 
irk harmless from any claims for damages regardless of cause. Equipment and 
iparatus furnished on the grounds are solely for the convenience of resident! 
id all persons using same do so at their own risl . 
Waiver. Nc failure of Park to enforce any term hereof shall be deemed a 
dverf nor shall any acceptance of a partial payment of rent be deemed £ 
tiver of Park's right to the full amount. 
Default. Should ResidentCs? fail to pay rent when due or violate any 
lie or other term or condition of this lease. Par!-: may elect to (a) continue 
te lease in effect and enforce all its rights and remedies hereunder, 
icluding the right tc recover the rent as it becomes due, or <b) at any time. 
?rminate all of Rpsident(s) rights hereunder and recover from Resident(s) all 
images the Pa-*!. n?i%/ incur by reason of the breach of the ler.se- All propert\ 
i the premises is hereby subject to a lier, in favor of Park, 'or payment of 
LI sums due to the ma/iimu- extent allowed by I«w. 
.Noticesr Any nctice r?> be given by mailing the sa.r.c, postage prepaid, tc 
ftsident(s) at the prsr.iser, the P-rk man-gar. k\*to ±Q^*Vnrk. $.4*4& , 
lose address is IMO East 11400 South, Scndy, 'Jtrh is authorized to r * 
it on behalf- z? the Pari: to receive notice:; cor.cernir.g the daily operation of 
he Park. Service of proiocr upon Park .Toy cr.ly be mad- by service upon Ja> 
asmussen, l?rr- East Vine St., Suit- 150, Salt Lr.l c City, Utah 84121. 
Attorns-/' s fees. In the c-.ert Pari- refes this Lease to an attorney for 
nforcement c termination, with cr without suit. Resident (s) shall pay all 
osts incurred, including attorney's fees. 
Time. is o r the essence of this agreement. 
IRESCEWP/'DCT VILLAGE 
Z/yfU 
TabC 
TO: JUNE JOHNSON 
255 E.HIDDEN VIEW DRIVE #267 
SANDYfUTAH 84Q7Q 
You are hereby notified that you are in violation of the 
park rules an/or leasehold provisions for the following reasons: 
! UNLICENSED VEHICLE-(WHITE CADILLAC) IN DRIVEWAY 
RULE #2b. 
2. YARD NOT MAINTAINED IN A NEAT,CLEAN,WEED FREE 
CONDITION, SWAMP COOLER AND BICYCLE PARTS,AND ALL 
MICELLANEOUS ITEMS MUST BE STORED PROPERLY, OUT OF 
DRIVEWAY. 
3. HOME NEEDS TO BE PAINTED, 
Pursuant to Section 57-16-6 (2) (a), Utah Code Annotated, 
you are hereby notified that you must cure the aforesaid violations 
within fifteen (15) days of the date of service of this Notice on 
you by curing and/or refraining from the above violations. If you 
fail to cure and/or refrain the referred to violations within said 
fifteen (15) day period, or a written agreement is not made between 
the park and you allowing for a variation in the rule or cure 
period, or vacate the premises within such period of Fifteen (15) 
days, you will be in violation of the above states statute and your 
lease agreement and rules of the park. If you fail to cure the 
violations, eviction will be commenced against you to evict you 
from the premises and to obtain judgment against you for any rent 
and other charges accrued, together with attorney's fees and costs. 
You are further put on notice, pursuant to Section 57-16-
5(2)
 r Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, that in the event you cure 
the above referred to violations, and should you in the future 
again violate the above rules or a different rule of the park, this 
will result in forfeiture of your lease and eviction without any 
further period of cure. 
This Notice is given and served in accordance with 
Sections 57-16-3, 57-16-5 and 57-16-6, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as 
amended. 
Please govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this 5 day of MAY , 19 9 3 . 
B y : — * < ^ ^ ? ^ /1*?*-/
 VJ ^{i± 
Manager for CRESCENTWOOD 
Mobile Home Park 
Address: 250 EAST 11400 SOUTH 
•<LA-
SANDY,UTAH 84070 
Telephone: 572-6333 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Jay Weaver 
Constable 
Salt Lake County . 
P.O. Box 538 
Sandy, Utah 84091 
Phone: (801) 571-7211 
CONSTABLE'S RETURN OF SERVICE 
I do hereby make return of service and certify: 
1. I am a duly qualified and acting Constable for the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, a citizen of the United States of America, a person over 
the age of eighteen at the time of this action, and that I am not a party 
to this action. 
A^iDAVll AND ORDER 
2. I received the within and hereto annexed L-a-c/v«£SLsy-*5^ |^ U ^ u fiof-
on the h 
SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT 
day of ^ ^ ^ , 1993, and served the same upon 
the within named defendant on the day of , 1993, 
by then and there delivering and leaving a true copy of said paper with 
the C~O — VAJ \~V->0-—J of said defendant, being a person of " T ^ ^ 
suitable age and discretion at the time of said service, residing at 
which is the usual place of abode or business of said defendant 
CkjAsJl tfW ^VAjCxJl^^o <K Copper / 
I do further1 certify and return that at! the time of said service I did 
endorse, the date of service, and my name and official title on the 
copy so served. 
DATED AT SANDY, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ON £ ~ £ , 1993. 
FEE 
MILEAGE 
MILES_ 
TRIPS" 
1 
2ND ADDRESS 
3 cfez 
CONSTABLE, 2ALJ LAKE COUNTY 
Subscribed to me tftis date 
^ CO lUs^-
NOTARY PUBLIC 
:
^ /<?3 
TabD 
TO: JUNE JOHNSON 
255 E.HIDDEN VIEW HPTVF #267 
SANDY^rTTfrH RdCiin 
You are hereby notified that you must remove the mobile 
home, yourself and the other residents living in the mobile home 
from the premises located at the address set forth above within 
three (3) days of your receipt of this notice. 
You were served with a fifteen day notice on MAY 
5 , 19 93 for non-compliance of mobile home park rules. 
A copy of said notice is attached hereto. Pursuant to Section 57-
16-5(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953), repeated failure to abide by 
mobile home park rules, after being served with a prior fifteen day 
notice of non-compliance, may result in termination of the lease. 
The applicable portion of Section 57-16-5(2) states as follows: 
An agreement for the lease of mobile home space in a 
mobile home park may be terminated during its term by 
mutual agreement or for any one or more of the following 
causes: ....(2) Repeated failure of a resident to abide 
by a mobile home park rule, if the original notice of 
non-compliance states that another violation of the same 
or a different rule might result in forfeiture* without 
any further period of cure. 
You are now again violating the rules of the mobile home 
park for the following reasons: 
1. YARD NOT MAINTAINED IN A CLEAN,MEAT AND 
WEED FREE CONDITION
 rWEKP£ AT.ONH BOTW g m p p n F • 
DRIVFWAY,RAILING NOT INSTALLED ON BACK PORCH. 
2. WEEDS IN E3ST SIDE OF YARD, KTr.YCT.r. PaPT^wnnnr^ 
PALLETS AND MICELLANEOUS TRASH TN VARD. • 
3. SON-JARED BEAGLEY HAS BEEN OUT AFTER CURFEW 
ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. _ • 
If you do not remove your mobile home, yourself, and any 
other residents living in the mobile home, from the park within 
three (3) days after service of this notice, you will be in 
violation of the above states statute and your lease agreement and 
the rules of the Park.' If you fail to move out of the Park within 
the above stated time, an action will be commenced against you to 
evict you from the premiss and to obtain judgment ;u.jai.iir.l; you i'oi; 
the rent and other charges accrued, together with attorney fees and 
This Notice is given and served in accordance with the 
provisions of Sections 57-16-5 and 57-16-6, Utah Code Ann., 1953, 
as amended. 
Please govern yourself accordingly. 
Jay Weaver 
Constable 
Salt Lake County 
P.O. Box 538 
Sandy, Utah 84091 
Phone: (801) 571-7211 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE CONSTABLE'S RETURN OF SERVICE 
I do hereby make return of service and certify: 
1. I am a duly qualified and acting Constable for the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, a citizen of the United States of America, a person over 
the age of eighteen at the time of this action, and that I am not a party 
to this action. 
AFFIDAVIT AND ORDER . f j 
2. I received the within and hereto annexed L^o-A*. "T-*2-^^^^^^ v v ^ 
SW1I10N0 AND COMPLAINT 
on the .J day of ^ H , 1993, and served the same upon 
the within named defendant on the 3 day of ^ . 1993, 
by then and there delivering and leaving a true copy of said paper with 
\A 
the ^ C-O- UO 
discretic 
of said defendant, being a person of 
suitable age and on at the time of said service, residing-^ 
which is the usual place of abode or business of said defendant. 
I do further certify and re"turn "that at the time of said service I did 
endorse the date of service,' and ray name and official title on the 
copy so served. 
DATED AT SANDY, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ON 
: $ 
'K'J . 1993. 
FEE 
MILEAGE 
MILES J 
TRIPS" / 
2ND ADDRESS 
CONSTABLE, MUX LAKE\ COUNTY 
Subscribed to me this date: o[j [ ^ '^  
NOTARY PUBLIC 
TabE 
Tnira judicial D.-sjnct 
James R. Boud, USB #A0388 
Bradley R. Jones, USB #A4747 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN & BOUD, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-0300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CRESCENTWOOD VILLAGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUNE JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
INC., ; 
l FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 Civil No. 930906137 
i Judge Tyrone Medley 
The trial in the above case was held before the above 
Court on Wednesday, November 2, 1994, the Honorable Tyrone E. 
Medley, presiding. James R. Boud appeared on behalf of Plaintiff, 
and John T. Anderson appeared on behalf of Defendant. The parties 
were also present along with various witnesses. The Court, after 
considering the evidence introduced during the course of the trial, 
reviewing the exhibits, giving consideration to the trial brief 
submitted by Mr. Anderson, reading the cases referred to in the 
trial brief, considering the principles of law and considering the 
testimony of witnesses, makes the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
DEC 2 Wk 
?u:y Oi&lc 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the parties entered into a 
lease agreement, which lease agreement included as an attachment 
all of the rules and regulations of the mobile home park dated July 
1, 1992, a copy of which was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 
"p-l". This lease agreement was for the lease of a mobile home 
space known as 255 E. Hidden View Drive, #267, Sandy, Utah. 
2. The Court ^inds that Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-2". 
which was a 15-day eviction notice dated May 5, 1993, was served 
upon the Defendant, June Johnson, on May 6, 1993, for rule 
violations as set forth in the notice. The Court specifically 
finds that the eviction notice was not served upon June Johnson for 
any religious reasons nor because the Defendant was living in a 
polygamous family structure. The only intent by the Plaintiff and 
by its agents in serving said notice was because of rule 
violations. 
3. The Court finds that there are other families in the 
Plaintiff's mobile home park who are living in a polygamous family 
structure who have not been evicted. The Court further finds that 
Defendant has other sister-wives living in the park on separate 
mobile home spaces and in separate mobile homes who are not being 
evicted. 
4. The Court further finds that the Plaintiff regularly 
enforces the parkfs rules and regulations against residents, 
irrespective of their religion, religious persuasion, family 
structure, or family status. 
2 
5. The Court finds that over a period of four years the 
Plaintiff in this case and its predecessor in interest, has been 
required to enforce many rule violations by the Defendant, June 
Johnson• The Court further finds that the Plaintiff and its 
predecessor in interest has tried to work with the Defendant, June 
Johnson, to get her to abide by the rules and regulations of the 
mobile home park during this time period. 
6. The Court finds that the rules and regulations of 
the mobile home park in this particular case, and especially those 
rules and regulations which were enforced by the park in the two 
eviction notices it served, are reasonable and necessary ~o promote 
the health, safety, and welfare of the park residents. 
/£? The Court finds that after the Defendant was served 
with the 15-day notice dated May 5, 1993, the Defendant attempted 
to cure the rule violations as set forth in that notice. The Court 
finds that the Defendant did completely cure the unlicensed vehicle 
violation and completely cured the mobile home painting violation. 
8. The Court also finds that the Defendant did much to 
cure the violation relating to the condition of her lot being kept 
in a neat, clean, and weed free condition. The Court finds that 
the Defendant removed much of the garbage and weed growth 
surrounding her mobile home; however, the Defendant did not remove 
all of the garbage and weeds and therefore never fully cured the 
violation relatincr to the condition of Jjer mobile home lot. 
9. The Court finds that as time went on after the 15 days 
expired from the May 5, 1993 notice, the Defendant failed to 
3 
maintain her yard in a clean, neat and weed free condition. This 
Court finds that the Defendant failed to continue to control the 
weed problem at her premises as evidenced by significant new growth 
in weeds. The Court further finds that additional new garbage, 
trash, and other objects accumulated on Defendant's lot. The Court 
finds that because of the ongoing nature of this violation, and the 
fact of the new weed growth, new garbage, and new accumulations of 
other junk or trash on her lot; this was aC new violation of the 
rules. 
10. The Court further finds that after the expiration of 
the May 5, 1993 notice, the Defendant violated on several occasions 
another rule of the park relating to violation of the curfew rule 
for her pinor son). Jared. 
11. The Court finds that after the May 5, 1993 notice 
had expired, the Defendant received two oral notices from Mr. Shupe 
that she was again^failing to maintain the garbage, trash, and 
f^ weeds on her lot, which was a violation of the park rules. These 
w verbal warnings were given to the Defendant in July of 1993, and 
?/ 
/\>J k the Defendant did absolutely nothing about the warnings and ignored 
them. 
12. The Court finds that the garbage, trash, and weed 
problems on the Defendant's lot were ongoing in nature because of 
continued accumulation of weeds, trash, and garbage. The Court 
finds that this problem worsened with time and that when Plaintiff 
on August 3, 1993 served its notice of lease termination for 
repeated failure to comply. This notice was introduced as Exhibit 
4 
"P-3,f. The Court finds that this eviction notice was served after 
a passage of more than sixty days from the expiration of the May 5, 
1993 notice, and considering the nature of the rule violations, the 
Court finds that this was a reasonable period of time that would 
not trigger or require an additional period of cure or an 
additional new 15-day notice as suggested by the Defendant in this 
particular case. 
13. The Court does not find under the specific facts of 
this case that a new 15-day notice was required by the lease 
agreement itself, by the law submitted to the Court by the 
Defendant, or by the application of the applicable statutes. In 
fact, the Court finds that the applicable statutes and notices 
served in this case are to the contrary and do not require an 
additional period to cure. 
14. The Court finds that the rental check of $425.00 
received by the Plaintiff from the Defendant on August 2, 1993, was 
for delinquent rent for the months of June and July, 1993, leaving 
the month of August, 1993 still outstanding. The Court finds that 
this rent was received and deposited by Plaintiff prior to the time 
the Defendant was served with an eviction notice on August 3, 1993. 
The Court finds that the date of tender of the check by the 
Defendant was the date of payment on August 2, 1993, that the 
Plaintiff deposited said rent check before service of an eviction 
notice, and that the Defendant's argument that the Defendant's 
check had not cleared all banking channels in the Federal Reserve 
System prior to the service of the eviction notice is not a valid 
5 
argument. 
15. The Court finds that Mrs. Brenda Shupe was a very 
credible witness for the Plaintiff, despite the fact that she 
appeared to be getting a little bit irritated on the witness stand. 
The Court finds that her credibility was not attacked in any 
substantial way by the defense, and the Court places great weight 
on her testimony, credibility, and veracity of her testimony. The 
Court finds that Mrs. Shupe was instructed by June Johnson to apply 
a §400.00 check dated July IS, 1993, to one of the Defendant's 
sister-wives' mobile home spaces in the park and not to the 
Defendant's space. This finding is further backed up by the fact 
that June Johnson came in and paid rent on August 2, 1993, in the 
amount of $425.00, and had she paid rent for her own space on July 
19, 1993, in the amount of $400.00, she would have been making a 
very substantial overpayment of rent on August 2, 1993. 
16. The Court finds that it was a common occurrence for 
June Johnson or one of her sister-wives to come to Mrs. Brenda 
Shupe and pay the monthly rental payment for another sister-wife 
who was occupying a separate mobile home space within the 
Plaintiff's mobile home park, and that this was done by June 
Johnson on or about July 19, 1993, even though she had :nreviouslv 
beejx^served with a 3-day eviction notice fc>r nonpayment of rent, 
which had not been cured. The Court further finds that after the 
payment of rent on August 2, 1993, despite the fact that the 
Defendant was not current on the rent, that the Plaintiff only 
served an eviction notice relating to rule violations of the park 
6 
and not to delinquency in rent. 
17. The Court finds that Mrs. Shupe made an honest 
mistake in the record keeping and clarified that mistake during the 
course of her testimony when she pointed out the fact that after 
receiving August 2, 1993 rent, one part of her ledger reflected 
that that was payment of rent through August of 1993. The Court 
further finds that another part of Mrs. Shupe1s ledger did reflect 
that there was still one month's rent owing after the payment of 
rent by June Johnson on August 2, 1993. 
18. The Court finds that the other residents in 
Plaintiff's mobile home park have had their general health, safety 
and welfare impacted negatively as a result of the Defendant's 
failure to maintain and control the weed problem, the trash 
problem, the garbage problem, and the curfew violations by the 
Defendant's son. The Court also finds that the Defendant lived 
next to another resident who would find dirty diapers and other 
trash in her yard, which the Court finds came from the yard of 
Defendant. 
19. The Court also finds that the Defendant did not 
control the actions of her /sop^ and that he violated curfew 
limitations on a number of occasions after May of 1993 and prior to 
August 3, 1993. These curfew violations included lighting 
fireworks in the park late at night, which fireworks landed in at 
least one neighboring mobile home space. 
20. The Court finds that although Plaintiff had no 
contractual duty to do so, the Plaintiff occasionally provided an 
7 
opportunity for residents during the course of the year to place 
trash or other items in a dumpster or in Mr. Shupe's trailer. The 
Court finds that the Plaintiff made Defendant, June Johnson, aware 
of the availability of its dumpster and trailer for use in cleaning 
up her lot. The Court further finds that Mrs. Johnson did not take 
advantage of the use of the dumpster or trailer fcr use in hauling 
off garbage from her lot. 
21. The Court finds that the Plaintiff engaged in no 
conduct that would have led the Defendant, June Johnson, to believe 
that the Plaintiff would waive strict compliance with the park 
rules, regulations, and lease agreement. This findings is an 
additional basis why the Court finds that the Plaintiff was not 
required under the facts and circumstances of this case to provide 
new notice or a new opportunity to cure in this particular case 
after the first 15-day notice. The Court finds that because of the 
ongoing nature of the rule violations by the Defendant, that the 
equitable considerations in this particular case weigh heavily in 
favor of the Plaintiff and not the Defendant, because, among other 
things, the evidence clearly established that the Plaintiff had 
worked with the Defendant a number of times and over a long period 
of time in an effort to get her to cure rule violations, including 
those rule violations which are the subject of this particular 
lawsuit. There was apattern established that the Plaintiff txied 
to work with the Defendant; and, hence, the equitable 
considerations in this Court's opinion point in favor of the 
Plaintiff. 
8 
22. The Court finds that for the most part the 
authorities cited by the Defendant's trial brief are 
distinguishable from the facts of this particular case. For 
example, the Court found that the Woodland Theaters, Inc. v. ABC 
Intermountain Theaters, Inc. case, 560 P. 2d 700 (Utah 1977) was not 
applicable to this particular action because, in this case, the 
Court has found that the Plaintiff did not accept rent after the 
notice of termination was served, and the Court has found that the 
rent paid was for delinquent past rent and not the present or 
future rent. 
23. The Court finds that the notices in this particular 
case were legally sufficient, consistent with the lease agreement, 
and consistent with Utah Code Annotated §57-16-5 and Utah Code 
Annotated §57-16-6. 
24. The Court finds that its previous order entered in 
January of 1994 relating to the dismissal of the counterclaim was 
a dismissal without prejudice and that there may be other legal 
issues or concepts in this case that may impact on whether or not 
the Defendant can revive this counterclaim, especially in light of 
the fact that the Court has clearly found that the Plaintiff did 
not bring its eviction proceeding for any reason other than rule 
violations and that the Plaintiff did not discriminate in any way 
against the Defendant on the grounds of religion, family status, or 
family lifestyle of the Defendant due to the fact that the 
Defendant is a polygamist, 
25. The Court finds that it is reasonable to enter in a 
9 
no cause of action judgment on the third party complaint which was 
brought by the Defendant, June Johnson, against the three 
individuals listed as Third Party Defendants. The Court finds that 
the Defendant failed to establish this cause of action by any 
evidence whatsoever, and that the evidence introduced by the 
Plaintiff clearly establishes that the third party complaint has no 
merit whatsoever due to the fact that this action, and the 
motivation therefor, was based solely upon rule violations of the 
park and not any religious, lifestyle, or family structure issues 
whatsoever. 
26. The Court finds that the attorney's fees in this 
case requested by the Plaintiff are reasonable. In making this 
finding, the Court finds and states that it reviewed the affidavit 
of Plaintiff in support of attorney's fees and costs on a line by 
line basis and that it did not make a summary review of the 
document. The Court also reviewed line by line each task described 
on each line in the affidavit and made a specific and separate 
evaluation of the reasonable period of time it would have taken to 
perform each task. The Court also, in finding that the attorney's 
fees were reasonable, reviewed the full history of this case in an 
attempt to determine what a reasonable attorney's fee would be in 
this particular case. The Court finds that this was not a typical 
unlawful detainer case and that it became far more involved and 
time consuming and complex. This case actually started out in 
Circuit Court but, as a result of the answer and claims filed by 
the Defendant, this particular case was ultimately transferred to 
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the District Court. There were a number of motions filed by both 
parties in this case which made it a little more unusual as 
compared to a standard eviction case. The Defendant in this case 
represented herself, filed a motion to quash early in this case and 
a request for attorney's fees even though she was pro se and not a 
lawyer. The Defendant also filed a motion for clarification of 
rehearing on this Court's ruling striking the counterclaim. There 
were a number of motions filed with discovery issues by the 
Defendant, as well as motions for summary judgment filed by the 
Defendant. The Defendant also appealed one of this Court's prior 
orders to the Utah Supreme Court, to which the Plaintiff had to 
respond. At one point in this case the Court was required to grant 
Plaintiff's motion for a protective order because of the 
overburdensome discovery that was being requested by the Defendant. 
The Court finds this case has a very long history and this Court is 
~f the opinion that the case did not move along the system as 
efficiently as it probably should have because of the fact that the 
Defendant in this case was pro se and continued to file numerous 
pleadings with the Court to which the Plaintiff had to respond and 
required additional attorney's fees. 
27. The Court finds that the hourly rate charged by the 
Plaintiff of $95.00 an hour, taking into consideration the 
Plaintiff's expertise in this particular area of the law, is a 
reasonable hourly rate in this community for these types of 
services. The Court has used its background to determine that this 
was a reasonable rate in light of the fact that it is regularly 
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confronted with the issue of attorney's fees and is knowledgeable 
of what attorneys in this community charge. 
28. The Court finds -hat the Plaintiff's request for 
attorney's fees in the amount of $9,3 67.50 and $4 6.00 in costs is 
reasonable. The Court finds that the Plaintiff's attorney put in 
approximately 100 hours of legal services, much of which was 
necessitated by the inefficiency of the Defendant in this 
particular case to deal with various issues that arose during the 
course of the case. The Court finds that 100 hours was a 
conservative figure of time incurred by the Plaintiff's attorney 
and that this figure was reasonable. The Court finds that every 
entry as to time and task described in the Plaintiff's affidavit 
for attorney's fees was reviewed by the Court and was reasonable. 
The Court finds that there was a rational, reasonable relationship 
between each task and the time allotted for the task, and nothing 
appeared to be inflated in the affidavit. The Court therefore 
finds that the request for attorney's fees and costs are reasonable 
and should be granted. 
29. The Court finds that the Defendant breached the 
lease agreement by failing to follow the rules and regulations of 
the park in this particular case and that the Defendant committed 
a new rule violation in light of the continuing nature and ongoing 
nature of the violations of trash, garbage, and weeds, as well as 
the violation relating regarding the curfew of her son. 
30. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to 
have the lease agreement between the parties terminated and that 
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the Clerk of the Court should issue a writ of restitution restoring 
Plaintiff to the premises. 
31. The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment for rent from August of 1993 through March 31, 1994, in 
the amount of $195.00 per month and for judgment in the amount of 
$2 05.00 per month for the time period beginning April 1, 1994 to 
the date of trial for a total of $3,200.00. 
32. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to 
all rents which are currently being held in trust by the Clerk of 
the Court and that these rents should be credited against the 
judgment being rendered herein. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes that: 
1. That Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against 
Defendant in the amount of $3,200.00 principal, $9,367.50 
attorney's fees, and $46.00 costs; 
2. The Court concludes that the notices served in this 
case were legally sufficient, consistent with the lease agreement, 
and consistent with Utah State statutes, including Utah Code 
Annotated §57-16-5 and §57-16-6. 
3. The Court concludes that the lease agreement between 
the parties should be terminated and that the Plaintiff is entitled 
to a writ of restitution restoring the premises to it located at 
255 East Hidden View Drive, #267, Sandy, Utah. 
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4. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has met its 
burden of proof on all issues in the case. 
5. The Court concludes that the third party complaint 
filed by the Defendant should be dismissed with prejudice. 
6. The Court concludes that the attorney's fees 
requested by the Plaintiff are reasonable based upon all the facts 
and circumstances of this case. >, 
DATED this ^ - day of "*^-^ 1994. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Johri<~T.' Anderson 
Attorney for Defendant 
014-072-bn 
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